Competitive Edge: Legal Insights
May 2026 | Başaran Law Firm
Google in the Hot Seat — Again: TCA Opens Billing Discrimination Probe
The Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) has launched a formal investigation into Google, comprising Alphabet Inc., Google Ireland Limited, Google LLC, Google International LLC, and Google Reklamcılık ve Pazarlama Ltd. Şti., for suspected abuse of dominant position under Article 6 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. The investigation, registered under decision number 26-08/233-M and dated 5 March 2026, was triggered by a preliminary inquiry that began in January 2026.
The core allegation concerns invoicing: Google bills some Turkish advertisers and ad agencies through Google Ireland, making them subject to Turkish withholding tax obligations, while billing others through its Turkish entity, thereby exempting them from the same tax. The TCA's preliminary finding is that this billing structure may create unequal cost burdens for businesses in the same commercial category, a form of discriminatory treatment that could constitute an abuse of dominance.
The online advertising market in Turkey relies on a multi-layered ecosystem in which advertisers, agencies and digital platforms are tightly interdependent. If the TCA concludes that Google's billing practices have imposed higher effective costs on a subset of its clients without objective justification, the consequences could include a significant fine and mandatory changes to Google's invoicing structure with implications that extend well beyond Türkiye for multinational advertisers operating across jurisdictions with different tax regimes.
Türkiye Scans the Algorithm: TCA Launches Its First AI Sector Inquiry
The Turkish Competition Board launched a comprehensive sector inquiry into the artificial intelligence ecosystem on 7 April 2026, marking the first time the TCA has trained its attention systematically on the AI value chain. The inquiry encompasses the full spectrum of AI activity from computing infrastructure and data access through to foundation model development and downstream applications.
The TCA's stated concern is structural. Access to data, computing capacity and specialised talent is highly concentrated, and early movers in foundation model development are positioned to leverage those advantages across multiple layers of the value chain. The Board identified specific risks: rising entry barriers, ecosystem lock-in, exclusionary behaviour, self-preferencing and tying by large digital platforms integrating AI into existing products and services.
The inquiry will also examine merger control through an AI lens. The TCA noted that in recent transactions it has reviewed, AI technology has increasingly defined the relevant market or introduced material concerns around data advantages, potential competition and innovation protection. For businesses operating AI-adjacent products in Türkiye, whether as platform operators, data licensors or application developers, the sector inquiry signals that the TCA intends to develop an informed enforcement posture well ahead of formal cases. Market participants should expect questionnaires and information requests as the inquiry progresses.
MediaMarkt's Relay Race with Fakir Ends in a 330 Million TL Fine
The Turkish Competition Board concluded on 2 April 2026 that MediaMarkt Turkey Tic. Ltd. Şti. violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by participating in a hub-and-spoke cartel, an arrangement in which competing retailers coordinate their pricing indirectly through a common supplier. The decision, numbered 26-11/343-130, imposes an administrative fine of 330,322,816.48 TL on MediaMarkt.
The cartel operated through Fakir Elektrikli Ev Aletleri Dış Ticaret AŞ, a supplier in the small home appliances sector. Fakir acted as the hub, facilitating the indirect exchange of commercially sensitive information between MediaMarkt, Teknosa İç ve Dış Tic. AŞ and Vatan Bilgisayar San. ve Tic. AŞ. The original investigation was opened by Board decision dated 20 February 2025, numbered 25-07/177-M(2).
Hub-and-spoke arrangements are particularly insidious because each spoke here, each retailer can maintain plausible deniability about direct competitor contact. Yet their combined effect is no different from a traditional horizontal price-fixing cartel. For retailers operating through shared supplier networks, this decision is a reminder that information flowing upward to a common supplier and back down to competitors can constitute a cartel even without a single direct conversation between rivals.
Scalpel to the Market: TCA Probes 29 Medical Device Suppliers for Price-Fixing
The Turkish Competition Board opened a formal investigation on 12 March 2026 into 29 manufacturers and distributors of orthopaedic and neurosurgery medical equipment spanning arthroplasty and arthroscopy products as well as four industry associations, for alleged price-fixing and supply restriction in breach of Article 4 of Law No. 4054.
Preliminary findings suggest the companies coordinated price increases and restricted the volume of products supplied to hospitals, both public and private, effectively circumventing price ceilings set under Turkey's Health Implementation Communiqué. By limiting supply, suppliers are alleged to have prevented hospitals from accessing products at the lower regulated prices pushing effective transaction prices above the prescribed levels.
The involvement of four industry associations alongside the individual companies is notable. Associations can serve as coordination vehicles providing a legitimate meeting platform, a shared information channel and an enforcement mechanism for cartel discipline. The TCA's decision to include them in the investigation reflects a well-documented international enforcement pattern. The medical devices sector presents obvious public interest stakes: coordination that inflates hospital procurement costs ultimately reaches patients and public health budgets. If violations are confirmed, the companies and associations face significant fines. Healthcare compliance officers and procurement-linked executives should treat this investigation as a prompt to review information-sharing arrangements within their industry.
Meta's Fee Trick Fools No One: Commission Escalates WhatsApp AI Access Dispute
The European Commission sent a Supplementary Statement of Objections to Meta on 15 April 2026, signalling its intention to impose interim measures requiring Meta to reinstate third-party AI assistants' access to WhatsApp under the conditions that existed before 15 October 2025.
The escalation follows a sequence of moves and countermoves. In October 2025, Meta updated its WhatsApp Business Solution Terms to ban third-party general-purpose AI assistants. The Commission sent an initial Statement of Objections in February 2026 and hinted at interim measures. On 4 March 2026, Meta reversed the ban and introduced a pricing framework for third-party access to AI assistants. The Commission's preliminary finding is that the fee-based model produces the same exclusionary effect as the original ban. As Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera put it: "Replacing the legal ban with pricing that has a similar effect does not change our preliminary view."
The investigation, registered as case AT.41034 under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, has now expanded to cover Italy following coordination with the Italian competition authority. Interim measures, if ordered, would apply until the Commission reaches a final decision. The case crystallises a key enforcement challenge in AI-adjacent markets: the distinction between legitimate monetisation and exclusionary access control. For any platform integrating AI assistants, the Commission's approach confirms that pricing structures designed to replicate an access ban will receive no more tolerance than the ban itself.
Paper Giants Under the Microscope: EC Opens Phase II into UPM-Sappi Joint Venture
The European Commission opened an in-depth Phase II investigation on 28 April 2026 into the proposed joint venture between UPM-Kymmene Corporation (Finland) and Sappi Limited (South Africa), the two largest manufacturers of communication paper in the European Economic Area. The transaction, notified on 19 March 2026 under case M.12270, faces a decision deadline of 8 September 2026.
The JV would combine UPM's European and US communication paper business with Sappi's European communication paper operations, part of Sappi's speciality paper business and supporting pulp and energy assets — creating the EEA market leader in communication paper.
The Commission's preliminary concerns span four product markets: coated mechanical (CM) paper and wood-free coated (WFC) paper (both used in magazines, books and office printing), coated-one-side face material (C1S) and pressure-sensitive labels (PSL). In CM and WFC paper, UPM and Sappi are identified as each other's closest rivals, together controlling a significant share of EEA production capacity. The Commission is concerned that remaining
competitors lack the ability or incentive to constrain post-transaction price increases.
The Phase II opening does not prejudge the outcome. UPM and Sappi are claiming cost efficiencies, environmental benefits and a more resilient European paper industry. However, given the structural overlap and the shrinking print media market, the Commission's path to clearance with or without remedies will require detailed evidence that the claimed benefits outweigh the competitive harm.
Europe's Tech Licensing Rulebook Gets a Long-Overdue Refresh
The European Commission adopted a revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) Commission Regulation (EU) 2026/877 together with updated guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU to technology licensing agreements, entering into force on 1 May 2026.
Technology transfer agreements covering the licensing of patents, software, know-how and other intellectual property to enable
production or use of specific technologies occupy a structurally important position in competition law. Correctly structured agreements facilitate innovation and technology diffusion. Poorly structured ones risk carving up markets or restricting competition under the cover of IP licensing.
The TTBER provides a safe harbour: agreements between companies meeting defined market share thresholds and not containing blacklisted restrictions are presumed compliant with Article 101(1) TFEU, without the need for individual assessment. The revised regulation and accompanying guidelines clarify where that safe harbour applies, how to assess agreements that fall outside it, and how to handle hard-core restrictions. For companies engaged in licensing arrangements across the EU, whether as licensors or licensees, the updated framework is the essential reference point for structuring deals, reviewing existing agreements and assessing negotiating positions. Legal teams handling IP transactions should conduct a compliance review of portfolio licence agreements against the new rules before the deadline passes.
The AA's Hidden Fee Habit: CMA Issues Its First-Ever Consumer Law Fine
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) ordered AA Driving School and BSM Driving School both owned by Automobile Association Developments Limited to refund over 80,000 learner drivers and pay a £4.2 million penalty on 15 April 2026. This is the first financial penalty the CMA has imposed under its new consumer protection powers, which came into force in April 2025 under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
The violation: drip pricing. Customers booking lessons on the AA and BSM websites between April and December 2025 were shown an initial price that excluded a mandatory booking fee. New customers only saw the full price at checkout after selecting lessons, choosing times and entering personal details. Returning customers saw the fee listed separately, with the total included only on the following page. Under consumer law, all unavoidable charges must be shown upfront.
The original penalty before discount was £7 million. The AA received a 40% reduction, down to £4.2 million, for admitting the breach and settling the case early. Affected customers will receive automatic refunds averaging around £9 each, with no action required on their part.
The wider message is clear. The CMA now has direct fining power, no need for a court order, and has committed to using it against drip pricing across sectors. Businesses currently showing split or delayed pricing in any online booking or checkout flow should treat this decision as a red line.
Booking.com's "Preferred" Partners May Not Be Preferred at All
The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) launched an investigation into Booking.com B.V., Booking.com International B.V. and Booking.com (Italia) S.r.l. on 22 April 2026 for allegedly engaging in unfair commercial practices in connection with its "Preferred Partner" and "Preferred Plus" accommodation programmes.
The AGCM's concern is about the gap between presentation and reality. Booking.com grants hotels in these programmes elevated search visibility, graphic prominence, and quality-related labels, implying to consumers that the selected properties offer superior service and value for money. But the Authority's preliminary finding is that eligibility for these programmes is driven primarily by the level of commissions paid to Booking.com, not by objective quality criteria. Consumers booking a "Preferred" property may therefore be paying more for accommodation selected by commercial incentive rather than merit.
The investigation was accompanied by inspections at Booking.com (Italia)'s premises, assisted by the Guardia di Finanza's Special Antitrust Unit, a dawn raid that signals the AGCM considers the evidence sufficiently serious to require immediate documentary preservation. This case sits at the intersection of competition law and consumer protection: the product ranking and labelling practices of major platforms increasingly determine commercial outcomes for the businesses listed on them. For hotel operators paying premium commission rates in exchange for "preferred" status, the investigation raises a structural question about whether that expenditure is purchasing genuine visibility or simply access to misleading marketing by proxy.
Italy's Snack Cartel — and the Settlement Tool That Arrived With It
The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) fined Amica Chips S.p.A., Pata S.p.A. and Preziosi Food S.p.A. a combined €23,298,147 on 28 April 2026 for operating a market-sharing cartel in the Italian private label savoury snacks sector, in breach of Article 101 TFEU.
The three companies were found to have coordinated their commercial strategies to divide up supply contracts for savoury snacks manufactured for large-scale retailers and sold under those retailers' own brands. The cartel was a single, complex and continuous agreement covering the allocation of client relationships and production volumes rather than direct price-fixing.
Two procedural features stand out. First, the AGCM applied its leniency programme: Pata and Amica Chips provided evidence significant in establishing the infringement, earning them fine reductions. Second and more notable the AGCM used the settlement procedure under Article 14-quater of Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990 for the first time ever. All three companies benefited from a further fine reduction as a result. Individual fines: Amica Chips €8,239,210; Pata €7,555,387; Preziosi Food €7,503,550.
Italy's first use of the settlement procedure is a significant procedural milestone. It signals that the AGCM is aligning itself with enforcement practices at the European Commission and several other national competition authorities, offering companies a structured route to earlier case resolution at a reduced fine in exchange for admission and cooperation. Companies facing AGCM investigations should now factor settlement as a genuine strategic option from the outset.
South Korea's Paper Trail: $245 Million and a 71% Price Surge
South Korea's Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) imposed total fines of 338.3 billion won, approximately $245 million, on six paper manufacturers on 23 April 2026 for colluding to raise printing paper prices over nearly four years.
The cartel ran from February 2021 to December 2024. The six companies — Hansol Paper, Korea Paper, Moorim Paper, Moorim P&P, Moorim SP and Hongwon Paper collectively account for around 95% of domestic printing paper sales. During the cartel period, executives held more than 60 meetings and agreed on seven rounds of coordinated price increases, implemented either by raising benchmark prices or by reducing the discounts offered to customers. The result: an average 71% increase in printing paper prices over the cartel period.
Printing paper is a key upstream input for textbooks, books, magazines and brochures. Price increases at this level cascade through publishing and printing supply chains and are ultimately passed on to consumers. Two participants, Korea Paper and Hongwon Paper, will face criminal referral to prosecutors, alongside the administrative fines.
The KFTC ranked the 338.3 billion won total as the fifth-largest cartel penalty in its history and the largest ever in the paper industry. Companies have been ordered to reset prices independently and report pricing changes every six months for three years. For global paper producers and procurement teams sourcing from the Korean market, this case is a reminder that input cost spikes attributed to "market conditions" may warrant scrutiny of the underlying competitive structure.
Brazil Asks Google: Who Really Owns the News?
Brazil's Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) voted unanimously on 23 April 2026 to reopen a formal investigation into Google over its use of journalistic content in search results.
The case, registered under process number 08700.003498/2019-03, had originally been recommended for closure by CADE's investigative unit after insufficient evidence of an antitrust violation was found.
Acting CADE President Diogo Thomson de Andrade led the push to reopen, arguing that technological developments since 2019, particularly the integration of generative AI into Google's search interface, have materially changed the nature and scale of the conduct under scrutiny. Where Google previously displayed headlines and excerpts, AI-generated summaries now synthesise and present news content directly within the platform, potentially reducing the traffic and revenue that flows back to news publishers.
CADE's tribunal instructed its Superintendence-General to initiate a formal administrative proceeding to examine whether Google may have committed an exploitative abuse of a dominant position in its relationship with news publishers. The analytical framework focuses on structural dependence, the degree to which publishers rely on Google to reach audiences, as the basis for assessing whether Google can unilaterally extract value from third-party content without proportional compensation.
The case tracks a global regulatory trend: Australia legislated a news media bargaining code; Canada enacted similar measures; the EU's Copyright Directive addresses related dynamics. Brazil's decision to reframe the question through a competition law lens rather than a copyright or regulatory framework adds a new dimension to the debate. For digital platforms aggregating news content, the direction of travel is consistent: the era of costless content aggregation is under increasing legal pressure.
*This publication is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice.